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This essay starts with the observation that issues of security, 
safety and risk became highly controversial political topics in 
the 1970s and 1980s. This is particularly true with respect to 
West Germany, where one can distinguish a broad and very 
diverse range of political debates concerning security and 
safety “gaps” in fields like social and military security, ecol-
ogy, plant safety, and, with respect to left-wing terrorism, also 
domestic security. Parallel to these political debates, a vast 
range of academic and intellectual efforts evolved to concep-
tualise the ongoing transformation of society and politics by 
the new issues of security. They range from modernization 
theory to ideas of newly emerging risk or surveillance societ-
ies. These intellectual debates are linked to various strands of 
social and political movements, both on the left and the right, 
which more often than not challenged social-democratic and 
reformist ideas of the Modell Deutschland with its emphasis 
on security. Debating security and risk went hand in hand with 
efforts not only to shape actively but also to describe modern 
societies. Thus the evolving technocratic, utopian, and dysto-
pian models of risk societies are of particular interest.
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Resumen
Este ensayo comienza con la observación de que las cues-
tiones de seguridad y el riesgo se convirtieron en temas 
políticos muy controvertidos en los años 1970 y 1980. Esto 
es particularmente cierto con respecto a Alemania Occidental, 
donde se puede distinguir una amplia y muy diversa gama 
de debates políticos relativos a las “brechas” de seguridad 
y vigilancia en campos como la seguridad social y militar, la 
ecología, con respecto al terrorismo de izquierda y también la 
seguridad nacional. Paralelamente a estos debates políticos, 
una amplia gama de esfuerzos académicos e intelectuales 
evolucionó para conceptualizar la transformación de la socie-
dad y los nuevos temas de la política y de la seguridad. Estas 
cubrían desde la teoría de la modernización a las ideas de las 
sociedades de riesgo o de vigilancia, de reciente aparición. 
Estos debates intelectuales están vinculados a distintos as-
pectos de los movimientos sociales y políticos, tanto de la iz-
quierda, como de la derecha, que a menudo no desafiaron las 
ideas socialdemócratas y reformistas del Modell Deutschland, 
con su énfasis en la seguridad. Los debates sobre la seguridad 
y el riesgo iban de la mano con los esfuerzos para dar forma 
activa y describir las sociedades modernas. Así, son de partic-
ular interés, la evolución tecnocrática, los modelos distópicos 
y utópicos de las sociedades de riesgo.
Palabras clave: Seguridad, riesgo, sociedad de la vigilancia, 
teoría de la modernización, 1970s, Alemania.
INTRODUCTION
In the words of the German political scientist Christopher Daase, “security” 
is not only a “major concept of value for modern –and postmodern– society”, 
it has actually developed into the “gold standard of all things political”1. De-
bates on (in)security and risks dominate day-to-day political topics, be it in 
the area of social, internal, or nuclear security, of disaster management or fire 
protection regulations. An ever-increasing number of scientific studies simul-
taneously satisfy and create an insatiable demand for analyses on security 
and risk in nearly all areas of economics, politics, and society. Their diagnoses 
identify and evaluate specific dangers and risks and thereby often evoke new 
scenarios of ubiquitous dangers and risks. This is certainly not a new observa-
1  Daase, Christopher, “Wandel der Sicherheitskultur – Ursachen und Folgen des erweiterten 
Sicherheitsbegriffs”. Peter Zoche et al. (eds.). Zivile Sicherheit. Gesellschaftliche Dimensio-
nen gegenwärtiger Sicherheitspolitik. Bielefeld. Transcript Verlag. 2010. p. 139; similarly, 
Conze, Eckart, “Sicherheit als Kultur. Überlegungen zu einer ‘modernen Politikgeschichte‘ 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. Vol. 53. 2005. p. 357-
380.
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tion with regard to either scientific theory in general or the field of security in 
particular. Already many years ago, the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann 
argued along similar lines to refute those experts in the field who promised 
simple solutions to security issues: “The terminology constitutes that about 
which is spoken”. Consequently, promises of security imply ever new forms in-
securities and risks: it is, if not a “social fiction” (Luhmann), then a “construct” 
(Münchener Rückversicherung)2. A group of scholars working in the field of in-
ternational politics associated with the political scientist Ole Wæver that is now 
known as the “Copenhagen School” places a somewhat different emphasis on 
the topic. This group of scientists examines performative phrases that actors 
use in a clearly discernible way to put security and risk issues on the agenda 
of various policy fields: within the realm of national security policy, a state of 
emergency and exception is evoked from which a need for action is derived 
–action that is to be implemented by way of supposedly nonpolitical and fact-
based decisionism. Also from the viewpoint of this group, dangers, risks, and 
security may not only be “real” but also socially and discursively constructed 
and arise in the form of a specific societal communication of risk. Accordingly, 
debates on security require a receptive public. This group of scholars high-
lights the idea that discourses on security in areas such as international poli-
tics, economics, and environmental policy interlace and mutually strengthen 
each other3. This applies not the least for certain regions and societies and has 
far-reaching implications for the development of national and international 
“security cultures”4.
Security and risk are by no means strictly present-day topics and phenomena. 
Recent language used in connection with security incorporates earlier seman-
tics of “calm and public order” as well as the semantics of peace and the wel-
fare state5. The American “national security state” has always included ques-
2  Luhmann, Niklas, Risiko und Gefahr. St. Gallen, 1990, p. 14 and 37; Münchener Rückversi-
cherung (ed.), Risiko ist ein Konstrukt: Wahrnehmungen zur Risikowahrnehmung. Munich, 
1993; Bonß, Wolfgang, Vom Risiko. Unsicherheit und Ungewißheit in der Moderne. Ham-
burg, Hamburger Edition, 1995.
3  Wæver, Ole, “Securitization and Desecuritization”. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.). On Security. 
New York. 1995. p. 46-86; Wæver, Ole et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boul-
der, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
4  Daase, Christopher et al. (eds.), Sicherheitskultur. Soziale und politische Praktiken der Ge-
fahrenabwehr. Frankfurt/M, Campus Verlag, 2012.
5  Daase, “Wandel der Sicherheitskultur – Ursachen und Folgen des erweiterten Sicherheits-
begriffs”, p. 139; Nehring, Holger, The Politics of Security. British and West German Protest 
Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945-1970. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013; Con-
ze, “Sicherheit als Kultur. Überlegungen zu einer ‘modernen Politikgeschichte‘ der Bundes-
republik Deutschland”, p. 484; Sherry, Michael S., In the Shadow of War. The United States 
since the 1930s. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995; Saupe, Achim, “Von‚ ´Ruhe und 
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tions concerning social and economic security since the late 1930s6. This said, 
this essay starts with the observation that, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, 
issues of security and risk arose to become not only a new guiding concept for 
political action but also a highly controversial topic in the academic commu-
nity, especially in West Germany, the country this essay looks at in particular. 
The questions addressed will explore, for one, the origins of the great contem-
porary interest in the topic of security starting in the second half of the 1970s 
and, for another, what it means that scholars treated this topic from the begin-
ning in the context of debates on theories on modernization and modernity. I 
will start out by exploring the debate on “gaps”, a term prevalent in the public 
policy debates in West Germany during the 1970s and one closely linked to the 
guarantee of comprehensive security to be provided by the state. This is then 
followed by several thoughts on the semantic peculiarities of the German word 
Sicherheit, which point both to nationally specific dimensions as well as to sev-
eral general developments in the more recent trans- and international debates 
on security and risk. The solution for security issues played a prominent role in 
the political catchword Modell Deutschland. In this essay, I interpret it as part 
of a –often diffuse– theoretical and practical paradigm of modernization and 
reform, whose real or supposed “crises” became the starting point for theoreti-
cal criticism and reflections on security, risk, and modernity. Why was the term 
modernity substituted in this context for the term modernization? What na-
tionally specific peculiarities thus became evident?7 The discussions presented 
here on “new” (in)securities, risks, and uncertainties were not limited to the 
intrinsic logic of academic controversies; as will be argued, they were rooted 
in social movements and political, social, and economic institutions. Criticism, 
crisis diagnoses, and thus theory and social practice were tightly interlaced and 
their mutual reinforcement makes it difficult to untangle them8. It is against this 
Ordnung‘ zur´ inneren Sicherheit‘. Eine Historisierung gesellschaftlicher Dispositive”. Zeit-
historische Forschungen /Studies in Contemporary History. Vol. 7. 2010. p. 170-19.
6  Ewald, François, Der Vorsorgestaat. Mit einem Essay von Ulrich Beck. Frankfurt/M, Suhr-
kamp, 1993; Borscheid, Peter, Sicherheit in der Risikogesellschaft. Zwei Versicherungen und 
ihre Geschichte. Stuttgart, Deutscher Sparkassenverlag, 1999; Moss, David A., When All 
Else Fails. Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
2002.
7  Although with another emphasis, see Wagner, Peter, Modernity: Understanding the 
Present. Cambridge, Polity, 2012; Dipper, Christof, “Die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft 
und die Moderne”. Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte und Literatur. Vol. 37. 2012. 
p. 37-62.
8  Here I take up ideas presented earlier in Geyer, Martin H., “War over Words: The Search for 
a Public Language in West Germany”. Steinmetz, Willibald (ed.). Political Languages in the 
Age of Extremes. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 2011. p. 293-330; Geyer, Martin H., “Poli-
tische Sprachkritik und Krisendiskurse in den 1970er Jahren”. Thomas Mergel (ed.). Krisen 
verstehen. Historische und kulturwissenschaftliche Annäherungen. Frankfurt/M. Campus 
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backdrop that this essay describes, on the one hand, the paradigmatic dysto-
pian, utopian, and technocratic diagnoses of security and risk and, on the other, 
the debates on modernity, which –as it is argued here– significantly shape our 
current debates, not just in Germany.
“GAPS”, PREVENTION, AND THE SPREAD OF RISK DEBATES
In 1977, the economist John K. Galbraith published what would become a 
widely translated book titled The Age of Uncertainty9. His choice of this title re-
flected a pervasive feeling that the times were experiencing dramatic change. 
This was not limited to economic life, where the oil crisis of 1973/74, (stag)
inflation, unemployment, and growing public deficits could be felt in almost 
all countries outside the communist orbit; more often than not, these phenom-
ena could only rather insufficiently be explained by established scientific ex-
planatory models, as the die-hard Keynesian Galbraith was forced to admit. 
In addition to economic problems, he also stated that international terrorism, 
environmental hazards, nuclear energy risks, and the classic field of national 
(military) security would pose new challenges in the future. Such changes were 
observed by many contemporaries and, in turn, were to become depicted in 
historiography as the end of the “golden age” (Eric Hobsbawn) and the “so-
cial democratic consensus” (Ralf Dahrendorf/Tony Judt), or as the demise of 
security and optimism about the future in the “period after the boom” (Anselm 
Doering-Manteuffel/Lutz Raphael)10. 
One way in which these changes were simultaneously debated in various West 
German policy fields was in terms of Lücken, meaning gaps, shortages, and 
deficits11. It is no accident that many depictions of the “crisis-ridden” 1970s 
identify the oil crisis as the beginning of the troubles. After all, wasn’t the 
Western model of growth and prosperity threatened by the emerging Ener-
gielücke, namely by the fact that the plentiful flow of cheap oil could be perma-
nently interrupted? Issues concerning the supply of energy became a matter of 
“national security”. The report of the Club of Rome on the limitation of national 
Verlag. 2012. p. 257-274; on social practice, see Reckwitz, Andreas, “Grundelemente einer 
Theorie sozialer Praktiken. Eine sozialtheoretische Perspektive”. Zeitschrift für Soziologie. 
Vol. 32. 2003. p. 282-301; Reichardt, Sven, “Praxeologische Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine 
Diskussionsanregung”. Sozial.Geschichte. Vol. 22. 2007. p. 43-65.
9  Galbraith, John Kenneth, The Age of Uncertainty. London, Houghton Mifflin, 1977.
10  See also Geyer, Martin H., “Auf der Suche nach der Gegenwart. Neuere Forschung zu den 
1970er und 1980er Jahren”. Archiv für Sozialgeschichte. Vol. 50. 2010. p. 643-670.
11  In the following, I draw on Geyer, Martin H. (ed.), Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutsch-
land seit 1945. Vol. 6. Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1974-1982. Neue Herausforderungen, 
wachsende Unsicherheiten. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2008.
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resources, which had been published shortly beforehand, set a new, more or 
less pessimistic tone, also because observers dramatized both the gaps that 
were to be expected in the future and the possible crises, if not catastrophes 
linked to them12. 
Following the first oil crises of 1973 and the second of 1979/80 came, 
timelagged, recessions that quickly –and permanently– put the topics of 
Wachstumslücken (gaps in economic growth), Beschäftigungslücken (unem-
ployment), and Haushaltslücken (huge public deficits) on the public agenda. 
The costs of social entitlements rose rapidly, especially in the public pension 
and health insurance systems, where a “gap” between revenue and expen-
ditures became blatantly evident in the winter of 1976/77. This particular gap 
was an embarrassment to the social-liberal government since the SPD had 
campaigned throughout the preceding federal election that social security 
contributions would remain stable and that pensions were “safe”13. Pensions 
were just one field in which the controversial question was raised whether the 
public’s expectations (as measured by public opinion pollsters) concerning the 
performance of the economy and the government, particularly the social state, 
would eventually manifest itself in Erwartungslücken (gaps between expecta-
tions and reality) and a fundamental Vertrauenslücke (gap of trust). Catastroph-
ic scenarios were presented depicting Staatsversagens (a failure of the state) 
and an alleged Legitimationskrises des Wolfahrtsstaats (a crisis of legitimation 
for the welfare state); such discussions were jumpstarted by similar debates in 
the United States and came into full swing in West Germany in 1976/7714.
It is important to keep in mind, that these debates on economic issues were 
mirrored in other areas. One such area was that of domestic security, in which 
the talk revolved around Sicherheitslücken, security gaps, that became evident 
in connection with the threat posed by terrorism. In the early 1970s, the 
12  Graf, Rüdiger, “Between National and Human Security. Energy Security in the United States 
and Western Europe in the 1970s”. Cornel Zwierlein and Rüdiger Graf (eds.). The Produc-
tion of Human Security in Premodern and Contemporary History. Cologne. 2010. p. 329-
350; Seefried, Elke, ‘Zukünfte’. Eine Geschichte der Zukunftsforschung 1945-1980. Munich, 
(forthcoming 2014/15).
13  Schmähl, Winfried, “Sicherung bei Alter, Invalidität und für Hinterbliebene”. Martin H. 
Geyer (ed.). Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945. Vol. 6. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1974-1982. Neue Herausforderungen, wachsende Unsicherheiten. Baden-Ba-
den. Nomos Verlag. 2008. p. 393-514.
14  Hennis, Wilhelm et al. (eds.), Regierbarkeit. Studien zu ihrer Problematisierung. Vol. 2. 
Stuttgart, 1977; Hacke, Jens, “Der Staat in Gefahr. Die Bundesrepublik der 1970er Jahre 
zwischen Legitimationskrise und Unregierbarkeit”. Dominik Geppert and Jens Hacke (eds.). 
Streit um den Staat. Intellektuelle Debatten in der Bundesrepublik 1960-1980. Göttingen. 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 2008. p. 188-206.
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sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann could still write that those aspects of security 
pertaining to the realm of policing had been solved, by and large15. The attack of 
Palestinian terrorists at the Munich Olympic Games of 1972 and the awareness 
that the Baader-Meinhoff group and their followers were linked, if only loosely, 
to international terrorist networks in Italy, Northern, Ireland, and the Near East, 
raised the issue of domestic or homeland security16. Whereas some critics, 
among them most pronouncedly conservative ones, attacked what they saw as 
the “gaps” in domestic security –gaps that would cost lives because of “gaps 
in personal protection”– and the failure of public authorities to react, others 
criticized the risks caused by the expansion of the Sicherheitsstaat, the security 
state17.
Just as ambivalent sounded the controversy over Sicherheitslücken, “safety 
gaps”, in the area of major technical plants, specifically nuclear reactors and 
chemical plants, and the potential risks they posed to human health and the 
environment. Were the guarantees given by technical experts and politicians 
credible? Were the risks and consequences of highly complex technologies 
truly calculable and controllable? Such critical questions pushed the topic of 
industrial and nuclear risks onto the political agenda. There was another side 
to this rising tide of antinuclear activism. Police, security agencies, and many 
onlookers considered the proponents themselves of such political and social 
activism as posing potential “security risks” through their blockades of nuclear 
reactors and military bases. This illustrates the entire polysemy of the secu-
rity and risk discourse. Moreover, one “gap” could be played against another. 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a social democrat, never tired of pointing out that 
the civilian use of nuclear power needed to be sped up in order to prevent 
an “energy gap” in the near and far future which might threaten Germany’s 
economic and welfare growth. Likewise the chancellor argued that the military 
15  Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver, Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem. Un-
tersuchungen zu einer Wertidee hochdifferenzierter Gesellschaften. Stuttgart, 1973, p. 71.
16  Schenk, Dieter, Der Chef. Horst Herold und das BKA. Hamburg, Spiegel-Buchverlag, 1998; 
Bull, Hans Peter, “Politik der inneren Sicherheit vor einem mißtrauisch gewordenen Publi-
kum”. Leviathan. N° 12. 1984. p. 155-178; Jaschke, Hans-Gerhard, Streitbare Demokratie 
und innere Sicherheit. Grundlagen, Praxis und Kritik. Opladen, VS Verlag für Sozialwissen-
schaften, 1991; Kunz, Thomas, Der Sicherheitsdiskurs. Die Innere Sicherheitspolitik und ihre 
Kritik. Bielefeld, Transcript, 2005.
17  Bergstermann, Sabine, Terrorismus, Recht und Freiheit. Die JVA Stuttgart-Stammheim 
als Ort der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Staat und RAF. PhD thesis Munich 2012, (forth-
coming 2014/15); Richter, Maren, Leben im Ausnahmezustand. Terrorismus und moderner 
Personenschutz 1970 bis 1993 in der Bundesrepublik. Frankfurt/M, Campus Verlag, 2014.
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“security and missile gap”, caused by the Soviet stationing of rockets, required 
the stationing by NATO of middle-range missiles in Europe18.
There existed numerous other debates that revolved around “gaps”, among 
them the one on the Geburtenlücke, the birth gap, as measured by the long 
evident decline of the birth rate and thus the coinciding increase in the surplus 
of deaths over births in West Germany since 1972/73. References to the “aus-
gefallenen Generation[en]”19, the missing generations, implied far more that 
prosaic statistical trends. Starting in the second half of the 1970s, this debate 
played an ever more prominent role in various other debates on social and 
economic policy. These new demographic arguments linked together various 
other topics, such as the emerging one on Rentenlücke, pension gaps, and also 
the economic Wachstumslücke, the growth deficit20. 
GAPS: THE RISKS OF THE FUTURE
Despite all the differences in emphasis and focus, the various gap-diagnoses 
at the time did have quite a few things in common. First, spokespeople ad-
dressed the discrepancy between the erstwhile predictions and seemingly 
well-established assumptions regarding the future, on one side, and the actual 
new developments looming on the horizon, on the other. Many of these as-
sumptions turned out to be “illusionary”, especially after the 1975 recession. 
Much of what had been considered “doable” and “feasible” until then, not the 
least thanks to high economic growth rates, proved now to be unrealistic, even 
“utopian”. The future became “insecure” and “uncertain”; earlier plans needed 
to be readjusted and adapted to the present. Often there was talk about a loss 
of optimistic expectations for the future, specifically for a “better future” that 
was usually understood as a linear improvement of the present21.
18  Nowotny, Helga, Kernenergie: Gefahr oder Notwendigkeit. Anatomie eines Konflikts. 
Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp, 1979; Lau, Christoph, “Risikodiskurse – Gesellschaftliche Ausein-
andersetzungen um die Definition von Risiken”. Soziale Welt. Vol. 40. 1989. p. 374-396; 
Haftendorn, Helga, Sicherheit und Stabilität. Außenbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik zwi-
schen Ölkrise und NATO-Doppelbeschluß. Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986; 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Die Krise der Sicherheitspolitik. Neuorientierungen und Entschei-
dungsprozesse im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1977-1984. Mainz, 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988.
19  Birg, Herwig, Die ausgefallene Generation: Was die Demographie über unsere Zukunft sagt. 
Munich, C.H.Beck, 2005.
20  Geyer, Martin H., “‘Gaps’ and the (Re-)Invention of the Future. Social and Demographic 
Policy in Germany during the 1970s and 1980s” (to appear in Social Science History 
2014/15).
21  This topic is addressed often in the literature and almost as a cliché in Ruck, Michael, “Ein 
kurzer Sommer der konkreten Utopie – Zur westdeutschen Planungsgeschichte der langen 
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Second, the diagnosed “gaps” identified a strange void between what was no 
longer and what did not yet exist: a state of transition, of liminality, even a la-
tent state of exception, in which – stated pointedly – the laws, theories and ex-
pectations of the past no longer functioned or at least were no longer adequate 
to explain the present situation. In other words, gaps dominated the new social 
and economic Erfahrungsraum (space of experience) and questioned existing 
and only slowly changing Erwartungshorizonte (horizons of expectations), in-
cluding established assumptions regarding the future. It is no accident that 
these two terms, coined by Reinhard Koselleck in 1976 (but not with the pres-
ent in mind), should so successfully persevere in academic debate up to the 
present day22. They concealed a more or less distinct political and scientific 
skepticism that spread throughout the second half of the 1970s and perma-
nently entrenched itself in West Germany, perhaps more than in other coun-
tries. From the discrepancy between spaces of experience and horizons of ex-
pectations resulted the gaps in expectation and the alleged crisis of legitima-
tion discussed in numerous diagnoses – for the time at hand and even more so 
for the anticipated future, both near and distant. 
Third, the various diagnoses of gaps called for practical action. It was in this 
context that risk discourses emerged and quickly spread, starting in the mid-
1970s. Certain terms corresponded to one another: risk and security, risk and 
insecurity, risk and uncertainty. Actors questioned, deconstructed, and funda-
mentally redefined real or assumed certainties using the topos risk in areas 
ranging from reactor safety and domestic security to the certainty of economic 
prognoses. In principle, this is not a new phenomenon. However, what makes 
this notable here is the backdrop against which it occurred, namely against the 
preceding assumptions in politics and science that it was possible to minimize 
risk, if not even eradicate it altogether, with the proper care and planning. 
This indicates, fourth, that whoever brought up the topic of “gaps” simulta-
60er Jahre”. Axel Schildt et al. (eds.). Dynamische Zeiten. Die 60er Jahre in den beiden 
deutschen Gesellschaften. Hamburg. Christians. 2010. p. 362-401; among others, see Metz-
ler, Gabriele, Konzeptionen politischen Handelns von Adenauer bis Brandt. Politische Pla-
nung in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft. Paderborn, Schöningh, 2005; Seefried, ‘Zukünfte’. 
Eine Geschichte der Zukunftsforschung 1945-1980.
22  Koselleck, Reinhart, “´Erfahrungsraum` und ´Erwartungshorizont` – Zwei historische Kate-
gorien”. Reinhart Koselleck (ed.). Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. 
Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp Verlag. 1989. p. 349-375; at least as important as the experience of 
the 1970s is the rekindling of the controversy over the “defeat” of 1945, which started not 
by accident in the mid-1970s, see Geyer, Martin H., “Am Anfang war… Die Niederlage. 
Die Anfänge der bundesdeutschen Moderne nach 1945”. Inka Mülder-Bach and Eckhard 
Schumacher (eds.). Am Anfang war... Ursprungsfiguren und Anfangskonstruktionen der 
Moderne. Munich. Fink Wilhelm. 2008. p. 279-306.
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neously called into question widespread expectations regarding the present 
and the future. This was a crucial shift. It gave the risky near or distant future 
–or better, what was predicted as risky– a strong veto power over actions and 
policies in the present23. Such not the least rhetorical operations went hand in 
hand with the dramatization of all sorts of risks. In a subtle way, assumed fu-
ture risks colonized the present and asserted preventative maxims for action.24 
This might include the shutting down of nuclear reactors as a preventative 
measure to protect against “incalculable security gaps” (risks) that they en-
tailed. Another example of the colonization of the present by the future was the 
“demographic gap”, namely the bleak consequences for an apparently distant 
future with regard to both the Germans as a people and the country’s social 
(insurance) policy. The “demographic gap” acted as a veto against both past 
and present pension policy, and this veto conjoined with alarmist demands 
for a change of the regime of social policy (such as through privatization or by 
changing the financing process) and to bring about, for example, the develop-
ment of new family policy measures. The risks of the future called for compre-
hensive preventive measures25. 
Last but not least, methodological and theoretical reflections make up a re-
markable fifth commonality in the context of all of these changes. “Gaps” 
underscored the power of (also at the time) newly “discovered” (historical) 
contingency: coincidence and accident as moments of all things unexpected, 
incalculable, and rule-breaking. This made the central premises even of major 
theories, including both liberal and Marxist theories of modernization, ques-
tionable and challengeable26. This was accompanied by a call to reformulate 
existing theoretical knowledge. In fact, we can observe an explosion of (post)
modern debates –not only on risk– occurring concurrently with this new per-
ception of contingency. Processes of “modernization” in the various different 
areas of public life appeared not only questionable and disputable, but often 
as the signum of the past, of a bygone epoch or era. This was clearly expressed 
in new concepts of a “first”, “classic”, and “industrial” modernity that suddenly 
23  On this, see also Opitz, Sven and Ute Tellmann, “Katastrophale Szenarien. Gegenwärtige 
Zukunft in Recht und Ökonomie”. Leon Hempel et al. (eds.). Sichtbarkeitsregime. Überwa-
chung, Sicherheit und Privatheit im 21. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden. VS Verlag für Sozialwis-
senschaften. 2011. p. 27-52; Geyer, “‚Gaps‘ and the (Re-)Invention of the Future”.
24  Bröckling, Ulrich, “Dispositive der Vorbeugung: Gefahrenabwehr, Resilenz, Precaution”. 
Christopher Daase et al. (eds.). Sicherheitskultur. Soziale und politische Praktiken der Ge-
fahrenabwehr. Frankfurt/M. Campus Verlag. 2012. p. 44-93.
25  See the contribution by Ulrich Bröckling in this essay.
26  Graevenitz, Gerhart et al. (eds.), Kontingenz. Munich, 1998; Knöbl, Wolfgang, Kontingenz 
der Moderne. Wege in Europa, Asien und Amerika. Frankfurt/M., Campus Verlag, 2007, p. 
169-207. 
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cropped up everywhere; crude as some of them were, they cleared the way 
for what become conceived a new “second”, “postmodern”, or “postindustrial” 
modernity27.
“GERMAN ANGST” AND THE SEMANTICS OF SICHERHEIT
As “real” as most of these gaps were in many instances, they only became 
public issues because of the new societal discourse on security and risk. The 
new social movements scandalized the technological risks of nuclear energy, 
asbestos or chemical production. However, important as it is, this is only part of 
the story. The new risk debates in the areas of economic and social policies, as 
well as domestic security, indicate that other, completely different actors were 
also contributing at the time to the outburst of talk about risk and security. 
One good example is the conservative Bavarian minister president Franz-Josef 
Strauss, who dramatized in his famous Sonthofen speech in 1974 an immanent 
catastrophe facing West Germany in nearly all areas and by urging his party to 
make “insecurity” the major theme in the upcoming election campaigns, as 
did others in the CDU/CSU. The theme of insecurity pertained not simply to the 
challenge of coping with terrorism, for which Strauss (and others) blamed the 
social-liberal government, but also to social security pensions, state finances, 
and particularly inflation. In turn, Social Democrats branded the CSU aspirant 
for the chancellorship, Strauss, as a “security risk” to German democracy, 
which was also a way to pay back the accusation made not only by Strauss that 
the political left in general posed a risk to domestic security28. The conservative 
opposition and the new social movements attacked the social-liberal coalition 
government wherever it used its security guarantees (to which we will return) 
to score points with voters. The point is that, at the time, “security” embedded 
itself as a hotly contested political term into the political conflict over the use 
of language and terminology29. 
This entanglement of different security and risk discourses fit well into the for-
eign perception of Germans and Germany as a people and a country driven 
by angst, particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s: angst about an atomic 
meltdown, nuclear war, the reduction of pensions and retirement benefits, in-
27  See the contribution by Steffen Henne in this essay.
28  Geyer, Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, p. 39-42; Mergel, Thomas, Pro-
paganda nach Hitler. Eine Kulturgeschichte des Wahlkampfs in der Bundesrepublik 1949-
1990. Göttingen, Wallstein, 2010, p. 257-281.
29  Geyer, “War over Words: The Search for a Public Language in West Germany”; Geyer, 
“Politische Sprachkritik und Krisendiskurse in den 1970er Jahren”.
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flation, dying forests, social and political unrest in Poland, communists, the 
1983 national census – angst about nearly everything and everyone. Some in 
the US administration were convinced that Helmut Schmidt was also driven by 
“fears” and by the very “German anxiety” that the chancellor decried in others 
so often. “German angst” became a catchword abroad30.
As divergent and polyphone as the talk about angst, (in)security, and risks 
might have been, it was precisely this divergence that amplified it. This can be 
attributed to the semantics of security in the German language31. The German 
word Sicherheit has a far broader meaning than the English word “security”. 
Sicherheit combines under a single semantic umbrella issues that the English 
language tends to keep separate. First of all, Sicherheit includes the broad field 
of safety, meaning protection against bodily harm, the protection of life and 
property in whatever form. Thus, in the internal operation of an economic en-
terprise, safety denotes the measures and policies aimed at reducing the risk 
of danger. In an airline company, for example, this involves the upkeep and 
inspection of airplanes and procedures designed to prevent accidents. For the 
industry as a whole, it means taking measures to ensure the smooth running 
of international air traffic. The English word “security”, which – tellingly – is now 
often used also in German, applies to the dangers threatening operations from 
the outside, dangers that are intentional, not accidental, such as the hijacking 
of an airplane. The dramatic increase in hijacking in the 1960s actually inaugu-
rated the dynamically expanding field of security in the airline industry. Analo-
gous to this in the field of nuclear energy, starting in the 1970s, were the de-
bates about “safety risks” (and the need for protection against radiation leaks) 
and “security gaps” (and the need for protection against terrorist attacks)32.
However, Sicherheit can also mean “certainty” in the sense of dependability 
and a reliance on the permanence of rules and values. In turn, Unsicherheit 
30  For critical evaluation of German angst by foreign observers, see Zapf, Wolfgang, Lebens-
bedingungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Sozialer Wandel und Wohlfahrtsentwick-
lung. Frankfurt/M., Campus, 1977, p. 5-10; Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die deutsche Diktatur. Ent-
stehung, Struktur, Folgen des Nationalsozialismus. Frankfurt/M, Ullstein Taschenbuchvlg, 
1976, p. 352; Wiegrefe, Klaus, Das Zerwürfnis. Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise 
der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. Berlin, Propyläen, 2005, p. 380; Kuby, Erich, Die 
Deutsche Angst. Zur Rechtsdrift in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin, Scherz Verlag 
Bern, 1970; on dealing with angst in the area of personal protection, see Richter, Leben im 
Ausnahmezustand.
31  See also Bonß, Wolfgang, “(Un-)Sicherheit in der Moderne”; Peter Zoche et al. (eds.). Zivi-
le Sicherheit. Gesellschaftliche Dimensionen gegenwärtiger Sicherheitspolitiken. Bielefeld, 
Transcript Verlag, 2011. p. 44-47.
32  Yonah, Alexander and Euegen Sochor, Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security. Dordrecht, 
BRILL, 1990.
    /  105SECURITY AND RISK. HOW WE HAVE LEARNED TO LIVE WITH DYSTOPIAN, UTOPIAN, AND 
TECHNOCRATIC DIAGNOSES OF SECURITY SINCE THE 1970S. – MARTIN H. GEYER
corresponds to the English word “uncertainty”, meaning a loss of trust in a situ-
ation. This is, first, a loss of trust in the permanence of rules, values, and state-
ments, and –thus closely linked to it– in the value of scientific explanations, be 
it Keynesianism, modernization theories, or scientific-technical risk analyses. 
Second, this implies a loss of trust in persons and institutions assumed to hold 
authority. Uncertainty is the mother of doubt, concern, uneasiness, and mis-
trust33. The coalescence of the English terms “(in)security”, “safety”, and “(un)
certainty” into the single German word (Un)Sicherheit points to national spe-
cifics regarding the new reality of risks in West Germany starting in the 1970s.
SICHERHEIT AND THE MODELL DEUTSCHLAND
With all this talk about security, were Germans just playing it safe? Certainly in 
soccer the defensive strategy of Sicherheitsfußball (and its first generation of 
true soccer millionaires in the 1970s) had helped the German national team win 
the World Cup in 1974. Whether this soccer strategy reflected a German obses-
sion with security in everyday life is certainly debatable and, like many political 
analogies in the world of sports, rather facile. However, it definitely illustrates 
the semantic flexibility of the German word Sicherheit. 
On the real playing field of politics, we find that Willy Brandt had been open to 
experimentation –“dare democracy” was the slogan of the 1969 election– yet 
Sicherheit definitely seemed to triumph under his successor Helmut Schmidt34. 
On various playing fields in national and international politics, the new chan-
cellor Schmidt took on the position of “crisis manager”. This was immediately 
evident in energy and economic policy and in his resolution not to give in to 
terrorists. Part of his trademark politics was a pessimistic evaluation of the 
global economy, namely his warning in the mid-1970s that the world was tee-
tering on the edge of a global economic crisis, one whose magnitude would 
match that of the Great Depression in the early 1930s35. Schmidt and his gov-
ernment were under heavy fire from the opposition, regardless if the issue 
was combating terrorism and correcting budgetary imbalances or problems 
of economic growth. Yet, like few others, Schmidt was a master the rhetoric of 
Lücken –gaps– be they in energy, investment, or public trust. His pessimisti-
33  Dosse, Francois, Geschichte des Strukturalismus. Vol. 2. Die Zeichen der Zeit 1967-1991. 
Hamburg, Junius, 1996/97.
34  Seitz, Norbert, Bananenrepublik und Gurkentruppe. Die nahtlose Übereinstimmung von 
Fußball und Politik 1954-1987. Frankfurt/M, Eichborn, 1987, p. 78-111.
35  On this and the debate over economic policy as security policy, see Böhm, Enrico, Die 
Sicherheit des Westens. Entstehung und Funktion der G7-Gipfel (1975-1981). Munich, Ol-
denbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2014, p. 277-289.
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cally imbued undertone and his insistence on the “tyranny of circumstances” 
(as the German translation of the above-mentioned book by Galbraith was tell-
ingly titled), which was used by his government to block exaggerated expecta-
tions for the future, irritated not only Schmidt’s fellow social democrats but 
also many of his international counterparts and partners, who might have had 
far more reason for such pessimism36. 
In Schmidt’s public image, the ability to “manage” new risks was a badge 
of efficiency and a certification of a “modern Germany”. In the federal elec-
tions of 1976, the SPD attempted to market this success story as the Modell 
Deutschland (Model Germany) and simultaneously pull the rug from under-
neath the opposition’s plans to present itself as having greater competence 
in the broad field of security policy. From the standpoint of the social-liberal 
coalition government, the handling of the recent crises was a political success 
story, in which the relatively small number of industrial conflicts, the increas-
ing standard of living, and the German reaction to inflation, unemployment, 
and recession during such uncertain times also played a key role37.
Politics for Schmidt was about coping with new risks and insecurity, both at 
home and in international politics. This becomes particularly evident in his 
Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture at the London Institute for International Stra-
tegic Studies in 1977. His key message was that “the economic, the social, and 
the international aspects of Western security” had taken on a new dimension as 
a result of the oil crises, the phasing out of the Bretton Woods currency system, 
worldwide inflation, unemployment, and the low rates of economic growth. 
With respect to “economic security”, he maintained that it was necessary “to 
safeguard the basis of our prosperity” and especially “to safeguard free trade, 
access to energy and to raw materials, also a monetary system which assists us 
in reaching those targets”. This was, as he emphasized, no less important than 
“social security”, which for him meant “the necessity to achieve and maintain 
36  Geyer, Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, p. 49-58; Haftendorn, Sicher-
heit und Stabilität; Rebentisch, Dieter, “Gipfeldiplomatie und Weltökonomie. Weltwirt-
schaftliches Krisenmanagement während der Kanzlerschaft Helmut Schmidt 1974-1982”. 
Archiv für Sozialgeschichte. Vol. 28. 1988. p. 307-332.
37  See Paterson, William E. and Gordon Smith (eds.), The West German Model: Perspectives 
on a Stable State. London, Routledge, 1981; Markovits, Andrei S. (ed.), The Political Econ-
omy of West Germany: Modell Deutschland. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982; Scharpf, 
Fritz W., Sozialdemokratische Krisenpolitik in Europa. Das ‘Modell Deutschland’ im Ver-
gleich. Frankfurt/M, Campus, 1987. German descriptions tended to be more critical, see 
Altvater, Elmar, “Editorial: Modell Deutschland. Anatomie und Alternative”. Prokla. Vol. 40. 
1980. p. 1-13; Rödder, Andreas and Thomas Hertfelder (eds.), Modell Deutschland. Erfolgs-
geschichte oder Illusion?. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007.
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social peace at home, making the goods and the jobs available for our people 
and at the same time bluntly telling them [the people] that there are limits to 
what the state can do for them”. This last point underscored his emphasis on the 
need to overcome the “inflation mentality” found everywhere, which Schmidt 
considered to be responsible for widespread “gaps in expectations” in other 
contexts. In addition to economic and social security, as well as domestic secu-
rity in the face of terrorism, the chancellor evoked vital and classic aspects of 
international security: “Political and military balance is the prerequisite for our 
security, and I would war against the illusion that there may be some ground or 
other for neglecting that balance. Indeed, it is not only the prerequisite for our 
security but for fruitful progress with détente”. Characteristically, he combined 
his call for stationing middle-range missiles with an appeal to incorporate all 
other dimensions of security, since they were all interconnected: “In the past, 
we have worked towards maintaining and mending our defences, but have 
possibly neglected the economic structure of our gardens, the importance of 
its beauty, and the threats to the roots of that beauty”38.
A certain measure of national arrogance was clearly inherent in such delibera-
tions. Hadn’t West Germany learned the lessons from the past, namely from 
the “German catastrophe”, better than many other countries? Schmidt would 
juxtapose (much like Willy Brandt before him) the risk the “old Germany” had 
posed for the world with the security offered by the new Germany, one inte-
grated into the West; Germany was no longer a warfare state but a welfare 
state39.
To no small degree, the charm of Modell Deutschland was that its set pieces 
fit well in the theory building taking place in the social sciences at the time. 
A younger generation of economists, legal scholars, and social scientists 
operated with the term “security” and comprehensive models of security. 
Much of this work was more or less reminiscent of, if not borrowed outright 
38  Schmidt, Helmut, “Politische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte der westlichen Sicherheit. Vortrag 
des Bundeskanzles in London, 28 Okt.1977”. Bulletin der Bundesregierung. Vol. 112. 1977. 
p. 1013-1020; Schmidt, Helmut, “The 1977 Alastaire Buchan Memorial Lecture”. W.F. Han-
rieder (ed.). Helmut Schmidt, Pespectives on Politics. Boulder. Westview Press. 1982. p. 24f; 
on the Modell Deutschland in 1976, see Geyer, Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland 
seit 1945, p. 42-46; see also the observations by Conze, “Sicherheit als Kultur. Überlegun-
gen zu einer ‘modernen Politikgeschichte‘ der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, p. 373-375.
39  Schmidt, Helmut, “Gedenken an den 8. Mai 1945. Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers vor dem 
Kabinett”. Bulletin der Bundesregierung. Vol. 59. 1975. p. 554f.; for very short references 
to post-nationalism, see Bracher, Die deutsche Diktatur. Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des 
Nationalsozialismus; Bracher, Karl Dietrich, “Politik und Zeitgeist. Tendenzen der siebziger 
Jahre”. Wolfgang Jäger and Werner Link (eds.). Republik im Wandel 1969-1974. Die Ära 
Brandt. Bd. 5/1. Stuttgart. DVA. 1986. p. 406.
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from, approaches in modernization theory (although these models appeared 
to have long surpassed their zenith of popularity and explanatory strength 
internationally by the mid-1970s)40. With regard to security, their main unify-
ing postulate declared the state as the guarantor of “welfare” and “security” 
in a broad bandwidth of areas ranging from social and economic policy to 
foreign and international security politics, precisely in the sense that Schmidt 
meant his message to be taken in his Buchan lecture. The terms Wohlfahrt and 
Wohlfahrtsproduktion, meaning welfare and its creation, thus covered various 
areas that were designated in the English language by the terms “security” 
and “safety” and, so went the technocratic assumption, could be measured 
through the use of indicators: the creation and guarantee of security was a 
credential of modern societies.
The knowledge gained through such scientific research was to be fed into the 
political process in order, for one, to rationalize policies and make it plannable 
and, for another, to minimize social conflicts and guarantee economic growth41. 
Since the use of the term security had been rather narrowly confined to interna-
tional politics, approaches in political science sought to expand its applicability 
by referring to the internal and external security of a state in other policy fields 
and to the protection of society from risks, especially in the context of social 
and economic security42. Important international impulses emanated from the 
report of the North-South Commission, published in 1980 under the chairman-
40  For a good overview, see Wehling, Peter, Die Moderne als Sozialmythos. Zur Kritik sozi-
alwissenschaftlicher Modernisierungstheorien. Frankfurt/M, Campus-Verlag, 1992; Wehler, 
Hans-Ulrich, Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Rup-
recht, 1975; Knöbl, Wolfgang, Spielräume der Modernisierung. Das Ende der Eindeutigkeit. 
Weilerswist, Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2001.
41  Kaufmann, Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem; Zapf, Lebensbe-
dingungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Sozialer Wandel und Wohlfahrtsentwick-
lung; Zapf, Wolfgang, “Wohlfahrtsentwicklung und Modernisierung”. Wolfgang Zapf (ed.). 
Modernisierung, Wohlfahrtsentwicklung und Transformation. Soziologische Aufsätze 1987-
1994. Berlin. Edition sigma. 1994. p. 175-187; Roller, Edeltraud, Einstellungen der Bürger 
zum Wohlfahrtsstaat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Opladen, Springer-Verlag, 1992; 
Kunz, Der Sicherheitsdiskurs. Die Innere Sicherheitspolitik und ihre Kritik. 
42  One good example is Schwarz, Klaus-Dieter (ed.), Sicherheitspolitik. Analysen zur poli-
tischen und militärischen Sicherheit. Bad Honnef-Erpel, Osang Verlag, 1981; the authors 
classify topics of military security within the larger framework of security; see especially 
the introduction in Frei, Daniel and Peter Gaupp, “Das Konzept ‘Sicherheit’ – Theoretische 
Aspekte”. Klaus-Dieter Schwarz (ed.). Sicherheitspolitik. Analysen zur politischen und mi-
litärischen Sicherheit. Bad Honnef-Erpel. Osang Verlag. 1981. p. 3-16; in this connection, 
also Buzan, Barry, People, States & Fear. Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era. With a New Introduction by the Author. Colchester, ECPR, 2007; Wæver, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
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ship of Willy Brandt, who put the fight against hunger and underdevelopment 
at the heart of a comprehensive concept of global justice and security43.
Such broadly conceived models of security were closely linked in the 1970s 
to social-liberal reform policy, in which security was not defined primarily in a 
national, military sense (the outline of which is apparent in Schmidt’s stance), 
but through the security offered by the welfare state. The socially emancipatory 
dimension resonating from this welfare-state postulate is unmistakable: the 
individual has the right to security, guaranteed by the state, also in the context 
of the international system of the United Nations44. 
Inevitably, such a nexus between these highly heterogeneous fields of security 
and reformist-emancipatory principles was not plausible to everybody. This 
was and still is true for practitioners and technocrats with their specialized fo-
cus in certain areas. Likewise, it is true for many social science theorists study-
ing phenomena of risk and security. In fact, it was at this precise moment –the 
mid-1970s– that a great many debates started which still preoccupy us today 
in some way or another. They have led to manifold attempts to describe and 
conceptualize security practices and to frame them within concepts of modern-
ization and modernity. 
NUCLEAR RISKS: THE TIGHTROPE BETWEEN CATASTROPHE AND UTOPIA
Ironically, at the very moment when comprehensive guarantees of security 
found their way into politics and when social scientists began to present their 
comprehensive theoretical conceptualizations of security, much of this started 
to be fundamentally questioned. Starting in 1976, critics from the left turned 
the SPD slogan Modell Deutschland on its head, albeit not for the first time: 
instead of stability and security, the new catchwords were “crisis” and “new 
risks”, in particular the risks of nuclear energy. The declared aim of the govern-
ment’s fourth –and in every sense overblown– nuclear program of 1974 was to 
close the looming “energy gap” by implementing an enormous reactor con-
struction program and thereby, so it was argued, guarantee the continuation of 
the modernization course in social policy through economic growth. This pro-
gram became the spark kindling the fire of a rapidly forming and by now well-
43  Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South, A Programm 
for Survival. London, 1980. On this, see also the contribution by David Kuchenbuch in this 
essay.
44  Kaufmann, Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem; Geyer, Geschichte 
der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945, p. 187-191; Wehling, Die Moderne als Sozialmy-
thos. Zur Kritik sozialwissenschaftlicher Modernisierungstheorien.
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documented protest movement that took off in the second half of the 1970s. 
The “Seven Years War in Brokdorf”, the site of one of the new nuclear power 
plants, became an on-going media event45. The confrontation over nuclear en-
ergy escalated in West Germany like nowhere else, during which time the dis-
course over security and risk flooded the political landscape. Various aspects of 
public “safety” and “security” became intertwined. If anything was certain at 
the time, then it was the loss of trust in scientific and governmental authorities 
who promised security46.
Who defined risks, and which risks were to be considered acceptable and which 
were not? The ecological movement and, following on its heels, the media not 
only dramatized these industrial risks and their side effects but also challenged 
ideas and policies concerning economic growth and, more generally, ideas 
about modernization47. A lay public became increasingly sensitized to the issue 
of “risk”. Soon experts were also challenging the expertise of their colleagues, 
which in turn raised many questions regarding the reliability, objectivity, and 
“constructedness” of scientific knowledge48. The result was a cacophony of risk 
discourses about security measures. How probable was the occurrence of the 
improbable? How risky was economic progress? The debates were fuelled by 
the accidents at the nuclear power plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1979, 
45  Gaul, Ewald, Atomenergie oder Ein Weg aus der Krise?. Reinbek/Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1974; 
Haenschke, Frank, Modell Deutschland? Die Bundesrepublik in der technologischen Krise. 
Reinbek/Hamburg, 1977; Hirsch, Joachim, Der Sicherheitsstaat. Das ‘Modell Deutschland’, 
seine Krisen und die neuen sozialen Bewegungen. Frankfurt/M, Europ. Vlg, 1980; Rucht, 
Dieter, Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen. Deutschland, Frankreich und USA 
im Vergleich. Frankfurt/M, Campus, 1994; Traube, Klaus, “Der siebenjährige Krieg um Brok-
dorf”. Stefan Aust (ed.). Brokdorf – Symbol einer politischen Wende. Hamburg. Hoffmann 
und Campe. 1981. p. 20-46; Kliment, Timor, Kernkraftprotest und Medienreaktionen. Deu-
tungsmuster einer Widerstandsbewegung und öffentliche Rezeption. Wiesbaden, Deut-
scher Universitätsverlag, 1994.
46  Weisker, Albrecht, “Expertenvertrauen gegen Zukunftsangst. Zur Risikowahrnehmung der 
Kernenergie”. Ute Frevert (ed.). Vertrauen. Historische Annäherungen. Göttingen. 2003; 
Weisker, Albrecht, “Powered by Emotions? Affektive Aspekte in der westdeutschen Kern-
energiegeschichte zwischen Technikvertrauen und Apokalypseangst”. Franz-Josef Brügge-
meier and Jens Ivo Engels (eds.). Natur- und Umweltschutz nach 1945. Konzepte, Konflikte, 
Kompetenzen. Frankfurt/M. Vandenhoeck & Ruprech. 2005.
47  On this point, see the contribution by Dietmar J. Wetzel in this essay.
48  For an early and interesting treatment of the topic, also on the basis of debates in Great 
Britain and the United States, see Nowotny, Kernenergie: Gefahr oder Notwendigkeit. Ana-
tomie eines Konflikts; Evers, Adalbert, “Risiko und Individualismus. Was in Ulrich Becks 
‘Risikogesellschaft’ unbegriffen bleibt”. Kommune. 6. 1989; Kuhbier, Peter, “Vom nahezu 
sicheren Eintreten eines fast unmöglichen Ereignisses – oder warum wir Kernkraftwerk-
unfällen auch trotz ihrer geringen Wahrscheinlichkeit kaum entgehen werden”. Leviathan. 
N° 14. 1986; and Lau, “Risikodiskurse – Gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen um die 
Definition von Risiken”; Stehr, Nico and Reiner Grundmann, Expertenwissen. Die Kultur 
und Macht von Experten, Beratern und Ratgebern. Weilerswist, 2010.
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and at the chemical plants in Seveso in 1976 and Bophal in 1984, in which 
chemical leaks killed people and animals. New topics emerged, among them 
the risks posed by asbestos or the causes of forest dieback (Waldsterben), and 
in the shadows of each of these bleak scenarios was the worst one of all, that 
of a M(aximum)C(redible)A(ccident) –the German equivalent “GAU” became 
a common word to designate the worst kind of accident in any context– in the 
nuclear energy industry49. 
Shortly after the nuclear reactor accident of Chernobyl in 1986, the German 
sociologist Ulrich Beck introduced the neologism Risikogesellschaft, risk soci-
ety, into the public debate, in order to describe modern societies. He certainly 
hit a nerve, especially in West Germany. Most of the themes about risks and 
side effects he dealt with in his book had already been raised prior to this in 
one way or another in the context of the “Atomtheater” (Helga Novotny) and 
had found their way into academic discourse. The success of Beck’s book and 
a number of similar publications by him at the time can also be attributed to 
the fact that he presented the argument in a much wider framework. He pro-
claimed nothing less than a historical caesura: not only was this the end of the 
great “Ma(r)x-Weber-modernization consensus”, meaning a paradigm of scien-
tific explanation, but it was also the end of the age of “industrial modernity”50. 
Actually his argument was a tacit rudimentary criticism of those premises on 
which the Modell Deutschland and its promises of growth, security, and wel-
fare were based. He presented the argument that capitalism produces its own 
self-destructive contradictions by warning that the side effects of traditional 
growth policy were increasingly destroying the very base of this growth. These 
side effects of earlier forms of modernization could not be corrected by simply 
stepping up modernization efforts, be it in the form of changes to the welfare 
state (Beck’s general argument regarding the inexplicitly raised topic of Modell 
Deutschland) or of technological improvements (his more specific argument 
about the risks of technology). The journey down this old path had come to 
a dead end in light of the challenges posed by the “new risks”, meaning the 
nuclear risks. This would have to lead inevitably to a break with existing policy, 
49  Among others in the contemporary literature, see Koch, Egmont R. and Fritz Fahrendholt, 
Seveso ist überall. Die tödlichen Risiken der Chemie. Cologne, Fischer-TB, 1978; Kraatz, Bir-
git, Seveso oder wie Verantwortung zur Farce wird: Ein Leerstück, aus dem die Großchemie 
nichts gelernt hat. Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1979; Perrow, Charles, Normal Accidents. Living with 
High Risk Technologies. New York, Princeton University Press, 1984.
50  Beck, Ullrich et al. (eds.), Reflexive Modernisierung. Eine Kontroverse. Frankfurt/M, Suhr-
kamp, 1996, p. 37; Beck, Ulrich, Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. 
Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986; Beck, Ulrich, Die Erfindung des Politischen. Zu einer 
Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung. Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993.
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which in hindsight reads like the justification for the recently implemented nu-
clear power phase-out by the government of Angela Merkel in the wake of the 
Japanese Fukushima accident.
The conclusions Beck reached were sweeping in every sense. In his opinion, 
future politics would no longer focus primarily on the distribution of wealth 
but on the distribution of risk. Modern risk societies revolved around problems 
and conflicts resulting from the production, definition, and distribution of risks 
produced by scientific, technological advancement51. This is precisely what 
characterized the transition, as Beck saw it, from a “first modernity” (which he 
hardly reflects upon) to a “second modernity”. Modern societies had to face 
up to the risks they produced in order to go beyond the ideas and solution of 
a “simple modernization”. This made a critical evaluation and departure from 
earlier premises of modernization necessary. He introduced the –ambiguous 
and often misunderstood– concept of “self-reflexivity”. A “self-reflexive” society 
not only encouraged new ways of thinking but also enabled the flourishing of 
civil society. Solutions could not come primarily from agents of the state but 
from a politically active and conscientious society that critically reflects its very 
foundation. Hence, Beck understood the communication of risk as a new form 
of social communitization, be it on the national or global level, of the “global 
risk society”52. 
THE ATOMSTAAT AND THE DYSTOPIAN AMBIVALENCE OF MODERNITY
What is remarkable about Beck is that he developed an optimistic, in some 
aspects almost utopian model of a project of civil society. He firmly put society’s 
handling of new risks at the heart of his social theory and questioned the state’s 
competence at providing solutions (even if it can be argued that a few of his 
premises bordered on triviality and naiveté)53. The ongoing debates on nuclear 
energy provided the inspiration. However, the sociologist Beck clearly distanced 
himself from a discourse of angst, one imbued with dystopian scenarios. This 
is noteworthy because prophecies of gloom and doom anchored in the German 
51  Beck, Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, p. 48; Beck, Ulrich, “Das 
Zeitalter der Nebenfolgen und die Politisierung der Moderne”. Ulrich Beck et al. (eds.). Re-
flexive Modernisierung. Eine Kontroverse. Frankfurt/M. Suhrkamp. 1996. p. 29; see also Gid-
dens, Anthony, Beyond Right and Left. The Future of Radial Politics. Cambridge, Stanford 
University Press, 1994, esp. p. 219-228.
52  Beck, Ulrich, Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Sicherheit. Bonn, 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007.
53  Evers, “Risiko und Individualismus. Was in Ulrich Becks ‘Risikogesellschaft’ unbegriffen 
bleibt”; Weiss, Johannes, “Die Zweite Moderne – eine neue Suhrkamp-Edition”. Soziologi-
sche Revue. Vol. 21. 1998. 
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intellectual tradition found their way into the antinuclear and peace movement. 
Such apocalyptic visions in the form of a nuclear MCA whether at a nuclear 
power plant or as result of deploying nuclear weapons (as depicted in the 
1983 U.S. feature film The Day After) were able to evoke nightmares. Not for 
the first time, Günter Anders, an activist in the antinuclear power movement 
of the 1950s, castigated humankind for its “apocalyptic blindness”, which he 
said resulted from a discrepancy between what humans could technically 
produce and what they could take responsibility for54. His writer colleague 
Christa Wolf took up this and other ideas of Anders and spoke of humanity’s 
“blind spot”, which she diagnosed as being caused by a “perception gap” 
(Wahrnehmungslücke)55. Such expressions of cultural criticism are numerous 
and can be found alongside debates in the peace and antinuclear movements 
on the probability of an MCA or other technological risks. They are another 
illustration of how societal risk communications, albeit dystopian, could bring 
together and communitize individuals. A good example in this respect is the 
spread of the grassroots social movement of “Zukunftswerkstätten” (future 
workshops), which were created by Robert Jungk and which developed an 
educational program for peace and ecological thinking. So, too, is the nuclear 
physicist Robert Jungk himself, who originally had played an important role in 
the German nuclear modernization program and “futurology”56.
For Jungk, the earlier scenarios of a better technological future had turned 
nightmarish. As he argued in his book Der Atomstaat (The Nuclear State, origi-
nally published in 1977 with several subsequent reprints), the nuclear industry 
was driven by powerful economic and political interests that made it a security 
risk to Western democracies. The protection of its citizenry from the dangers of 
nuclear energy, if not from the potentially destructive effects on all of human-
ity, made far-reaching preventative measures necessary that strongly impacted 
the private sphere of citizens57. Jungk’s assessment was prompted not only by 
law violations perpetrated by the police and justice authorities, but also by new 
forms of control and monitoring directly affecting scientists and employees in 
nuclear power plants. He had in mind the “Traube case”, which the magazine 
54  Anders, Günter, “Über die Bombe und die Wurzeln unserer Apokalypse-Blindheit”. Günger 
Anders (ed.). Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Über die Seele im Zeitalter der industriellen 
Revolution (1st edition, 1956). Munich. C.H.Beck. 2010.
55  Delisle, Manon, Weltuntergang ohne Ende. Ikonografie und Inszenierung der Katastrophe 
bei Christa Wolf, Peter Weiss und Hans Magnus Enzensberger. Würzburg, Königshausen u. 
Neumann, 2001, p. 81.
56  Seefried, ‘Zukünfte’. Eine Geschichte der Zukunftsforschung 1945-1980.
57  Jungk, Robert, Der Atom-Staat. Vom Fortschritt in die Unmenschlichkeit. Munich, rororo, 
1977, p. IX-XI.
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Der Spiegel had made public and thereby sparked a major public controversy. 
Klaus Traube was a physicist who played a significant role in developing the so-
called fast breeder nuclear reactor in the town of Kalkar. Because the security 
authorities suspected him of maintaining contact to terrorists, West German 
intelligence had kept him under surveillance since 1975 and had wiretapped 
his apartment without any legal authority. His employer, the Kraftwerk-Union 
AG fired him. The idea that fissionable material could wind up in the hands of 
nonauthorized persons was a strong argument for a new and comprehensive 
form of preventative surveillance of people and objects58. 
Was West Germany on the way to becoming a modern Sicherheitsstaat, a se-
curity state? Jungk was not the only one to draw comparisons to the Nazi era. 
The focus was not simply on nuclear energy; in fact, talk about the “nuclear 
state” thrived on the multifarious associations with other risky fields of secu-
rity. Among these, in the critical year 1977, were the very far-reaching measures 
within the framework of an –undeclared– state of emergency in combating 
the escalation of terrorism. These included special deployment forces like the 
GSG9 (a newly created special police task force), police actions against suspi-
cious groups of people like house squatters, new police techniques like drag-
nets, and last but not least, security checks to determine whether employees, 
civil servants, and personnel in “security-relevant areas” as well as teachers 
were “loyal to the constitution”. All of this went hand in hand with preventa-
tive measures to create risk profiles of possible perpetrators and also potential 
victims of terrorism59. 
It was in this context that the Modell Deutschland came under criticism for its 
peculiar composition as a cross between a welfare state and a technologically 
perfect police-surveillance state. The social scientist Joachim Hirsch voiced the 
opinion of many members of the new social movements: the social and wel-
fare state served to advance social conformity and new forms of social control 
and repression, with the aim of bringing under control the consequences not 
58  Traube, Klaus, Müssen wir umschalten? Von den politischen Grenzen der Technik. Reinbek/
Hamburg, 1978; Traube, Klaus, “Lehrstück Abhöraffäre”. Wolf-Dieter Narr (ed.). Wir Bür-
ger als Sicherheitsrisiko. Berufsverbot und Lauschangriff. Beiträge zur Verfassung unserer 
Republik. Reinbek/Hamburg. 1977. p. 61-78; Funk, Albrecht and Falco Werkentin, “Die sieb-
ziger Jahre. Das Jahrzehnt innerer Sicherheit?”. Wolf-Dieter Narr (ed.). Wir Bürger als Si-
cherheitsrisiko. Berufsverbot und Lauschangriff – Beiträge zur Verfassung unserer Republik. 
Reinbek/Hamburg. 1977.
59  For a good overview, see Becker, Peter, Dem Täter auf der Spur. Eine Geschichte der Krimi-
nalistik. Darmstadt, Primus, 2005, p. 187-209; Schenk, Der Chef. Horst Herold und das BKA; 
Reichert, Ramón (ed.), Governmentality Studies. Analysen liberal-demokratischer Gesell-
schaften im Anschluss an Michel Foucault. Münster, 2004.
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only of modernization and reform politics but also the protests and resistance 
these provoked. The security guarantee of Modell Deutschland and moderniza-
tion politics had the reverse effect: new forms of surveillance and security, pre-
dicted Hirsch, would become increasingly important, not the least because the 
number of discontented people, namely the losers of modernization, would be 
on the increase60. 
In 1975, Michel Foucault published his book Surveiller et punir: Naissance de 
la prison, which appeared two years later in English and in German. With this 
book the French theorist did indeed touch a raw nerve. Stammheim Prison, 
where some of the imprisoned members of the Baader-Meinhof group commit-
ted suicide in 1977, certainly did not resemble Bentham’s panopticum. In fact, its 
so-called “high security tract” was somewhat of a misnomer, considering the 
peculiar setup of cohabitation and the availability of communication devices 
and even weapons61. However, Foucault’s ideas turned out to be powerful both 
as a way to conceptualize modern ideas on surveillance and (self-)control, as 
implemented also in psychiatric hospitals, schools, the military, and factories. 
In these institutions built on discipline and normalization, Foucault discerned 
the origins and the basis of both modern societies and modern individuals.
Foucault was not only an observer and analyst of the German situation; he was 
also an active participant in the political and ideological confrontations and 
controversies in Germany at the time. He spoke out on behalf of Klaus Crois-
sant, a lawyer for the terrorist Red Army Faction, who had fled to France and 
applied for political asylum in order to evade prosecution in West Germany. 
In connection with the public campaign supporting Croissant, Foucault even 
visited Germany in 1977, where in Berlin he apparently gained first-hand expe-
rience in dealing with the police and border guards of both German states62.
Against the backdrop of these events, Foucault developed his ideas about the 
état de securité, the security state. According to Thomas Lemke, this was the 
period in which the idea crystalized in Foucault’s mind that the state he lived 
in was less a state of law than a security state, whose measures simply over-
rode legal norms (an argument somewhat reminiscent of Ernst Fraenkel’s Dual 
60  Hirsch, Der Sicherheitsstaat. Das ‘Modell Deutschland’, seine Krisen und die neuen sozialen 
Bewegungen; see generally also Wehling, Die Moderne als Sozialmythos. Zur Kritik sozial-
wissenschaftlicher Modernisierungstheorien. 
61  See Bergstermann, Terrorismus, Recht und Freiheit. Die JVA Stuttgart-Stammheim als Ort 
der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Staat und RAF. 
62  Macey, David, The Lives of Michel Foucault. New York, Vintage Books, 1993, p. 392-396.
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State from 1942 in which the German lawyer described the Nazi state)63. This 
security state, argued Foucault, was based on a security pact between agencies 
of the state and the populace, the basis of which was fear. In order to guarantee 
security, the state had to have the freedom to act against and outside the law. 
In Foucault’s view, the “fear state” was the Janus face of the “state of law”64. 
By all means, this was another dystopian interpretation of the events of 1977, 
one reflecting ideas that exceeded the specific German case and the period of 
the 1970s.
In West Germany, such arguments could easily be mingled with the thoughts 
argued by Horkheimer and Adorno in their classic Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1944): The very ideas of universal reason, the rational pursuit of order, and the 
power of knowledge inherent in modernity, with their expressed assumption 
of universal validity, could and did bring not only benefits but also terrible 
excesses. These arguments were reworded during the 1970s in French debates 
over the Soviet Gulag and Auschwitz, not the least in terms of a fundamental 
critique of the ‘project of the left’ and its theoretical grand récits65. In different 
ways, Zygmund Baumann and Giorgio Agamben followed up on these argu-
ments. By the 1990s, this critique of modernity was having a major impact on 
academic debates (although comparatively late in West Germany). Baumann 
became certainly one of the more influential thinkers with his argument that 
efforts to do away with uncertainty and ambivalence – also in the sense of es-
sentialist thinking, the essence of project of enlightenment – could and did lead 
to the abyss of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. Since 9/11, such disqui-
eting, dystopian models of the “security state” have received much attention, 
not just in scholarly historical research, but also in analysis of contemporary 
liberal states66.
63  Geyer, Martin H., “Grenzüberschreitungen: Vom Belagerungs- zum Ausnahmezustand”. 
Niels Werber, Stefan Kaufmann and Lars Koch (eds.). Erster Weltkrieg. Kulturwissenschaft-
liches Handbuch. Stuttgart. J. B. Metzler Verlag. 2014. p. 375f.
64  Here I follow Lemke, Thomas, Eine Kritik der politischen Vernunft. Foucaults Analyse der 
modernen Gouvernementalität. Berlin, Argument Verlag ,1997, p. 192.
65  Christofferson, Michael Scott, French Intellectuals against the Left. The Antitotalitarian Mo-
ment of the 1970s. New York, Berghahn Books, 2004; Lyotard, François, The Postmodern 
Condition (French original: 1979). Minneapolis, University Of Minnesota Press, 1984.
66  Bauman, Zygmund, Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989; 
Bauman, Zygmund, Modernity and Ambivalence. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991. Ag-
amben, Giorgio, Ausnahmezustand. Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004; Neocleous, Mark, 
Critique of Security. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2008.
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THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RISK SOCIETY: LIBERAL CRITICISM OF THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY STATE
With its criticism of the assumptions bolstering modernization and reform the-
ories, on the one hand, and of the social-liberal politics of economic growth 
and reform, on the other, the discourse in leftist and “alternative” circles ques-
tioned, in equal measure, theoretical assumptions, political and technological 
guarantees of safety and security, and their corresponding policies, for which 
Modell Deutschland was the metonym. The story of the emergence and po-
litical institutionalization of the social movements in West Germany starting in 
1977 was rather unique and relied on a successful communication about risk, 
not only in the policy areas of environmental protection and nuclear power. 
Ulrich Beck’s “risk society” can be considered the unofficial albeit controversial 
manifesto of this project, not the least because he offered perspectives on al-
ternatives to the taming of apocalyptic and dystopian types of energy by way 
of civil society.
However, it is extremely short sighted yet quite common to search for the con-
juncture of the critical debates on risk and security primarily only within the 
realm of the ecological movement. After all, we need only remember the po-
lemic political debates on gaps in areas like domestic security, economic poli-
cy, and social policy. Starting in the second half of the 1970s, the conservative 
political opposition, a growing number of economists, and certainly a great 
deal of the press never tired of underscoring the serious risks linked to the 
social-liberal reform politics. In fact, there existed no shortage of catastrophic 
scenarios that revolved around the ghost of (hyper)inflation, economic decline, 
technological gaps, the dissipation of bourgeois values during an acclaimed 
“value change”, the crises of state legitimation on a Weimarian dimension, and 
not to forget the implications of the “birth gap”67. We may evaluate these dra-
matic scenarios of decline and downfall as being primarily calculated argu-
ments reflecting political strategy, quite unlike emotional and “fundamental-
istic” scenarios of the antinuclear and peace movements. But this seeming 
realism should not obscure the fact that the real or supposed gaps and their 
consequences for the near or distant future were very alarming and therefore 
made it necessary to revise earlier policies and to develop new intellectual ap-
proaches and theories, including ideas of comprehensive prevention in various 
policy areas.
67  See Geyer, Geschichte der Sozialpolitik in Deutschland seit 1945.
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Open to criticism were all aspects of social-liberal reform politics68. One key 
idea of this criticism was that of uncontrollable and unintended “side effects”. 
This topos permeated not only ecological debates, but also those of economists 
and many culture critics. It was argued that the government’s reform politics 
created the very problems –namely the risks– that it was attempting to solve. 
It the 1975 report of the Trilateral Commission, called into existence by David 
Rockefeller, Samuel Huntington and his colleagues blamed welfare-state 
politics for the demise of private and public values and argued that the welfare 
state represented a risk both to social and political stability and to the military 
strength of the West. The democratic process and the “lack of trust” created by 
the welfare state came under fire69. “The government is the problem”, declared 
the newly elected president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, in a catchy 
and immediately famous statement during his 1981 Inaugural Address, a 
statement that appeared to announce a fundamental change of the political 
and theoretical paradigms. At its extreme, this line of argument resulted in a 
fundamental criticism of the state that featured dystopian scenarios in which 
an expansive government was said not only to lead to economic and social 
disaster but also to restrict individual freedoms one by one and thus lead the 
country down the “Road to Serfdom” (Hayek)70.
The new paradigm of side effects implied vehement controversy over reform 
and modernization policies. Be it university reform or social policy, it appeared 
necessary to “reform the reforms” in all areas and so rectify the side effects of 
earlier government interventions. The sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann later 
coined this as “reform of the second order” (Reform zweiter Ordnung)71. When 
Beck criticized that, in the “first modernity”, interventions would continue to 
be necessary in order to correct unintended side effects, he was certainly in 
keeping with the trends of the time. Similar arguments had been made ear-
lier by advocates of critical theory and, from a thoroughly different angle, by 
68  Also for the many examples to follow, see Wehling, Die Moderne als Sozialmythos. Zur 
Kritik sozialwissenschaftlicher Modernisierungstheorien.
69  Huntington, Samuel P., “The United States”. Michael Crozier et al. (eds.). The Crisis of De-
mocracy. New York. New York University Press. 1975.
70  The work of Ayn Rand are a good example of this, see Burns, Jennifer, Goddess of the 
Market. Ayn Rand and the American Right. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Cock-
ett, Richard, Thinking the Unthinkable. Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 
1931-1983. London, Fontana Press, 1995.
71  Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver, “Der Sozialstaat als Prozeß für eine Sozialpolitik zweiter Ordnung”. 
Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (ed.). Sozialpolitik und Sozialstaat: Soziologische Analysen. Opla-
den. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 2002; Hockerts, Hans-Günter, “Vom Problemlöser 
zum Problemerzeuger? Der Sozialstaat im 20. Jahrhundert”. Archiv für Sozialgeschichte. 
Vol. 47. 2007.
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proponents of radical free market reforms. Yet opinions diverged about the 
conclusions to drawn from such diagnoses. If the “actual problem” was gov-
ernment policy, then the implication was a corrective plan of action, begin-
ning with comprehensive guarantees of security. This meant the dismantling 
and restructuring of the social and interventionist state, which – we must re-
member – was created to rectify market failures and thus the side effects of 
capitalism and to guarantee “security”72. Welfare state guarantees, economic 
growth, and social security were contrasted to market liberalization, be it in the 
health industry, aviation industry, energy industry, or on the capital markets. 
Liberalization meant the transfer of risk from the state and public institutions 
to the individual and the realm of the market in the sense of “reprivatizing 
risks”, a still relatively new catchphrase in the second half of the 1970s that was 
used in both a critical and affirmative context. It was argued that individuals 
and market institutions could deal with risks better, more efficiently, and more 
rationally (in terms of rational choice models) than the state. Funded pension 
schemes were considered to be a safeguard against the emergence of any gaps 
in financing (as existed in pay-as-you-go systems), especially in the context of 
demographic change. The option to bundle (mortgage) loans and risks and to 
disperse these widely through new financial products seemed to offer a prom-
ising way to deal with risks. “Securitization” became the new technical term 
for this (and should not be confused with the term as used also by the political 
scientist Ole Wæver)73. 
From this vantage point, the Modell Deutschland looked like a relic from the 
past, not the least because the fixation on state-guaranteed security on which 
these models were based was said to limit economic freedom and mobility, for 
one, and an individual and entrepreneurial spirit of risk-taking, for another74. 
The reprivatization of risk pointed to the solution: unfetter not only the Schum-
peterian, risk-taking, no-longer-government-regulated entrepreneur, but also 
the entrepreneurial self of every individual. Although Schumpeter’s destruc-
tive capitalism produced uncertainty and insecurity, it offered at the same time 
vast new opportunities, growth, and thus prosperity, argued its proponents75. 
72  Rodgers, Daniel T., Age of Fracture. Cambridge/Mass, Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 41-
76; Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable. Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 
1931-1983. Comparable studies are currently not available for Germany.
73  Ranierie, Lewis S., “The Origins of Securitization, Sources of its Growth, and its Future Po-
tential”. Leon T. Kendall and Michael J. Fishman (eds.). A Primer on Securitization. Boston/
Mass. The MIT Press. 1996. p. 31.
74  See the contribution by Wencke Meteling in this essay.
75  The almost classical argument originates from Giersch, Herbert et al., The Fading Miracle: 
Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
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In contrast to the state, “the market” and its actors were said to guarantee the 
efficient and economic communication of risk, which in turn would make it 
possible to handle economic and social risks effectively; security had a price, 
one that was measurable and calculable by way of the financial assessment 
of specific risks. There can be no doubt that a latent utopian undercurrent ex-
isted in the political expression of neo-liberalism at the time. The likes of Milton 
Friedman promised not only “freedom” (thus the title of his 1980 television 
series starring the Chicago economist) but a brave new world.
One underestimates all too easily the popularity of the appeal of freedom and 
its polemics against the fetters of the old security of the welfare state. This 
seemingly new philosophy of the market was probably more popular in West 
Germany than it has often been assumed, in part because of the strong theo-
retical tradition of market liberalism in Germany which experienced a revival 
in the 1970s, but also because it corresponded so closely with aspects of mod-
ern consumerist lifestyles, such as taking risks and managing individual risks. 
Good examples are the various “alternative” health movements that sprung up 
in the second half of the 1970s which advocated “self-help” and criticized the 
“industrial-health complex”, including the welfare state. This is also illustrated 
well by the notorious “free climbers” of the 1970s who expressed the spirit of 
the times in their own way: they heaped scorn on those fellow climbers who 
went into the mountains with large crews and the latest high-tech gear meant 
to provide an old-fashioned type of safety at the expense of ruining virgin rock. 
To the outsider, free climbing might appear as outrageously risky. However, 
by the 1980s, its practitioners had developed various sophisticated systems of 
classification with which they measured the degree of difficulty of mountain 
slopes. Dangers were thus being transformed into a calculable set of “profes-
sional” risks; each rock climber had to know which risk he could manage. By 
the 1990s, the “cliff hanger” had become an icon of modern culture of indi-
vidualism, although most mountain climbers strongly disliked the commercial 
box office hit with the same title released in 1993, starring Silvester Stalone76. 
Another example of the new attitude toward managing risk on an individual 
basis was the endless German debate over speed limits on the autobahns, in 
1992; Caldwell, Bruce J., Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F.H. Hayek. Chica-
go, University of Chicago Press, 2004; Abelshauser, Werner, Kulturkampf. Der deutsche 
Weg in die Neue Wirtschaft und die amerikanische Herausforderung. Berlin, Kulturverlag 
Kadmos, 2003.
76  Gschwendtner, Sepp, Sicher Freiklettern. Technik und Training. Munich, Bergverlag Rother, 
1981; Messner, Reinhold (ed.), Freiklettern mit P. Preuß. Munich, 1986. Thompson, Michael, 
“Aesthetics of Risk: Culture or Context”. Richard C. Schwing and W. A. Albers (eds.). Soci-
etal Risk Assessment. How Safe is Safe Enough. New York. Springer. 1980. 
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which the popular slogan of the 1980s was “Freie Fahrt für freie Bürger” (let 
free citizens drive freely)77.
Once again it was Michel Foucault who recognized these developments quite 
perceptively and also attributed a pioneering role to the “German model”. Did 
liberalism and its emphasis on individual freedom and the free movement of 
people and goods not also bring about surveillance and monitoring technolo-
gies in the form of a highly differentiated system of public security? What inter-
ested Foucault the most in 1977/78 was the emergence of new technologies of 
the self, which enabled modern individuals to govern and control themselves. 
He linked this development to the rise of neo-liberalism generally and to the 
“German model” specifically. Although this was a somewhat maverick inter-
pretation both of the intellectual tradition of German economic liberalism and 
–albeit not specifically addressed by Foucault– of the Modell Deutschland, it 
was indeed an accurate view of the new reality in which the concern over col-
lective and individual security and the concern about government control and 
self-control intermingled with and complemented each other78. 
THE TECHNOCRATIC RISK SOCIETY
Like no other scholar, the sociologist Niklas Luhmann challenged various as-
sumptions of the contemporary debate on security. For Luhmann, security was 
not just an empty term, it was social fiction.79 In like manner, he equally con-
demned the security guarantees of the social and welfare state and almost 
ridiculed the assumptions of his colleague Ulrich Beck80. For him security was 
unattainable, and the pursuit of security only created new insecurity. As had 
many others, Luhmann criticized the social and welfare state for creating its 
77  Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club, Argumente und Dokumente des ADAC gegen 
Tempo 100 auf Autobahnen. Munich, 1986.
78  Foucault, Michel, Geschichte der Gouvernementalität. Vol. 2. Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp, 2004, 
esp. p. 269; see also Hesse, Jan-Otmar, “!Der Staat unter Aufsicht des Marktes! – Foucaults 
Lektüren des !Ordoliberalismus!”. Susanne Krasmann and Michael Volkmer (eds.). Michel 
Foucaults ‘Geschichte der Gouvernementaltitä’ als Pradigma der Sozialwissenschaften. In-
ternationale Beiträge zu Rezeption und Anschlüssen. Bielefeld. 2007; Bröckling, Ulrich et 
al. (eds.), Gouvernementalität der Gegenwart. Studien zur Ökonomisierung des Sozialen. 
Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000. Reichert, Governmentality Studies. Analysen liberal-
demokratischer Gesellschaften im Anschluss an Michel Foucault. For the following observa-
tions, Cruikshank is of particular interest. Cruikshank, Barbara, The Will to Empower. Demo-
cratic Citizens and other Subjects. Cornell/London, Cornell University Press, 1999.
79  Luhmann, Risiko und Gefahr. 
80  Luhmann, Niklas, “Die Welt als Wille ohne Vorstellung. Sicherheit und Risiko aus der Sicht 
der Sozialwissenschaften”. Die politische Meinung. Vol. 31. 1986; Luhmann, Risiko und Ge-
fahr.
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own risky side effects, which either needed to be mended or were used as a 
pretext to expand the welfare state. Thus the welfare state had the tendency 
to grow to vast dimensions because nearly every aspect of societal life can be 
seen as containing inherent social dangers and risks81. Luhmann also found 
fault with all those, including technology experts, who claimed to create and 
guarantee security. Here he questioned the logic of their arguments: if the evo-
lution of the modern world was characterized by the transformation of an ever 
greater number of dangers into risks, then for precisely this reason, security 
was never attainable. On the contrary, all talk about security implied a grow-
ing insecurity for the present and in the future, because that which was tradi-
tionally viewed as dangers becomes defined in terms of risk. For this reason, 
Luhmann argued that modern societies are characterized by ever-increasing 
insecurity. Who decides what the risks are? Furthermore, who knows what the 
possible side effects of earlier decisions are? 
Luhmann thus provided a fundamental critic of the assumptions and theoretical 
stances based on broad concepts of security. In a highly differentiated modern 
society with distinct debates on risk in various fields of science, law, econom-
ics, and politics, it is futile to imagine that there could be a unifying concept of 
risk and security. His basic argument that security is not only something unat-
tainable but that it obfuscates more that it explains was another renunciation 
of those slightly varying models of security that operated more often than not 
on the basis of assumptions of modernization theory82. Ever new forms of risks 
were the feature of modern societies, in fact, of modernity. Modern societies or, 
simply put, “modernity” was embroiled in endless risk debates, for these societ-
ies always have to make decisions regarding a future that neither individuals nor 
institutions could really know much about. This could be juxtaposed to theories 
and policies of modernization which had promised safety and security83. 
Luhmann’s decisive point was that these risks were very different in each field 
or societal subsystem, be it in technology, the economy, or the social sciences. 
In other words, each subsystem develops its own logic with respect to risk 
debates, and this logic need not correspond with that of other subsystems. In 
fact, it could often contradict these. This was reason enough for Luhmann to 
consider it illusionary, if not absurd, to demand democratic participation in the 
decision-making processes, as was being advocated by laypersons within the 
81  Luhmann, Niklas, Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat. Munich, Olzog, 1981.
82  This should also be read with regard to his criticism of the welfare state, see Ibíd.
83  Luhmann, Risiko und Gefahr, p. 10-12; see also Bonß, Vom Risiko. Unsicherheit und Unge-
wißheit in der Moderne.
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antinuclear movement and other self-declared lay experts. Just as illusionary 
in his mind were the visions of societal risk communication as propagated by 
Ulrich Beck84. 
The rejection of broad concepts of security, whatever the type, in favor of diag-
nosing specific, case-based concepts of risk in scientific research corresponds 
not only to the trend toward scientific specialization. It also reflects “system 
logics” of the lawyers who run the government’s bureaucratic apparatus with 
their narrowly defined departmental responsibilities. Even without any under-
standing of Luhmann’s complicated social system theory, we can see how such 
highly specialized expertise on risk multiplied, professionalized, and institution-
ally established itself starting in the second half of the 1979s (a story that has 
yet to be written, especially with regard to possible particularities of the West 
German experience). There can be no doubt that a rapidly growing academic 
industry dealing with risks emerged and became loosely entwined with the sci-
ence bureaucracy, in part with the scientific-industrial complex. Much like the 
“hungry little caterpillar” of children-book fame, this insatiable research on risk 
has embedded itself in science and bureaucracy. It identifies not only looming 
safety and security “gaps” and an increasing number of risks, but also defines 
the threshold values (Grenzwerte), whose compatibility and reasonableness 
need to be determined in the context of highly controversial debates on secu-
rity, not only within scientific circles but also in the public media. 
In many respects, the technocratic operators of these safety and security tech-
nologies are the true inheritors of Modell Deutschland. Its advocates, who 
had claimed to guarantee fundamental security for all of society, might have 
lost their somewhat naïve belief in guarantees of security; however, securing 
against risk remains an ever-present political mission. This has inspired new 
governmental and nongovernmental agents and industries dealing with secu-
rity issues, which in turn demand new models for risk analysis that – at least 
theoretically – can already identify the next security gaps and lurking risks. In 
this process, the emphasis is on prevention85. It is always about extrapolating 
current risks and security gaps to predict those of the future (and vice versa), 
whereby the – if not catastrophic then at least gloomy – scenarios of the future 
colonize the present: technocratic micromanagement of real and potential risks 
becomes the iron cage of self-created “practical constraints” on bureaucratic 
apparatus. 
84  Luhmann, Risiko und Gefahr, p. 27f.
85  On the logic of prevention, see the contribution by Ulrich Bröckling in this essay.
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CONCLUSION
Despite all of this criticism leveled against political guarantees of security and 
modernization theories, we can neither overlook the fact nor deny the irony 
that the guarantee of security did indeed become the “political gold standard”. 
This is clearly evident with regard to international initiatives. In 1994, the head 
of the Development Program at the United Nations, delineated in its Human 
Development Report a program for action, at the heart of which was noth-
ing less than “a new concept of human security”. The world will not live in 
peace “unless people have security in their daily lives”. In this report, security 
is defined on a very broad scope so as to protect against all possible dangers. 
Security here ranged from “economic security, food security, health security, 
environmental security” down the line to “personal security” and “political se-
curity”. “Personal security” referred to “threats from the state (physical torture), 
threats from other states (war), threats from other groups of people (ethnic 
tension), threats from individuals or gangs, against other individuals or gangs 
(crime, street violence), threats directed against women (rape, domestic vio-
lence), threats directed at children based on their vulnerability and dependence 
(child abuse), threats to self (suicide, drug use)”. Under the rubric “political se-
curity”, the stated aim was to ensure that “people should be able to live in a 
society that honours their basic human rights”86. All of these aspects could 
be based on the security of each country – the Human Development Report 
included the publication of a Human Development Index with national rank-
ings – but, as the authors underscored, “threats to human security [are] (…) 
no longer just personal or local or national. They are becoming global: with 
drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation. Global poverty and en-
vironmental problems respect no national border. Their grim consequences 
travel the world”. There was no reason for trepidation. Just as the world had 
made progress in the past, it was possible “to engineer change”87. It is quite 
obvious that the subtle charm of 1970s modernization theory enveloped this 
program. On a political-normative level, a high degree of security in society 
was propagated as being not only desirable, but plannable and doable. Very 
similar to the German-language usage of the word Sicherheit, here “human 
security” comprises the areas of “safety” and “security”. In contrast to govern-
ment actors as the guarantors of security, nongovernmental actors are given 
86  Human Development Report, Published for the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). New York, 1994, p. 1, 30, 32.
87  Ibíd., p. 2.
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greater weight, thereby enhancing the chances to guarantee “human security” 
through a global, civil-society community of fate88. 
Thus we have come full circle. We started by looking at a process that com-
menced in the late 1960s and 1970s in West Germany and – at first glance – ap-
pears contradictory. On the one hand, the agendas of reform and moderniza-
tion played a major role in soundly anchoring postulates about the state guar-
antee to provide social, economic, and domestic security. On the other, public 
diagnoses of existing “gaps” in various policy fields placed the topic of risk 
prominently on the political agenda. It is in this constellation that we can locate 
the explosion of public debate and theoretical deliberation on topics concern-
ing risk and security. Typical for this debate is the polyphony of voices that 
ranged from the ecological movement via the rapidly growing group of secu-
rity technocrats to the neoliberal economists. These converged in their criticism 
of all comprehensive models and premises of security that were connected to 
the reform agendas of the social-liberal government coalition and to the policy 
models inspired by modernization theory. With this waned the self-confident 
positioning of scientists and practitioners in a purposeful process of modern-
ization that promised a more publicly guaranteed security both in theory as in 
practice. Their optimism was struck down by the “(residual) risks” surfacing 
everywhere in “gaps” and by the incalculable “side effects” of this same mod-
ernization process. Yet this exercise in distancing from and critically reflecting 
upon the modernization process and its theories cleared the way, if not for 
the reconceptualization, then the discarding of the assumptions inherent to 
modernization theory. Characteristic was the substitution of the term modern-
ization and the emergence of the abstractly conceived term of “modernity” 
–be it a “first”, “second”, even “post” modernity– that was used to describe the 
transition to new forms of security and risk societies.
Many questions remain open, particularly those dealing with the international 
comparison of the German debate and thus the construction of German per-
ceptions of security. Striking is that the guarantees of security were criticized 
early and very boldly in West Germany, which certainly has something to do 
with the peculiarity of German terminology. What is also notable is the strong 
fixation of West German social theorists on the concept of risk, which can un-
88  Paris, Roland, “Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”. International Security. 2001; 
Chandler, David and Nik Hynek (eds.), Critical Perspectives on Human Security. Rethinking 
emancipation and power in international relations. New York, Routledge, 2011; Conze, Eck-
art, “Securitization. Gegenwartsdiagnose oder historischer Analyseansatz”. Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft. Vol. 38. 2012.
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doubtedly be traced to the practical experiences of social movements. As has 
been argued in this essay, the concept of risk – with thoroughly positive con-
notations – experienced a boom, especially in the realm of neoliberal economic 
theory. However, everything indicates that the fundamental positions and di-
agnoses, which surfaced in the 1970s and are identified in this essay, are gen-
eralizable and to be found in one form or another in more recent approaches 
and debates on security in other industrial societies, namely the dystopian, 
utopian, and technocratic models of security and risk. These are as varied and 
multiform as the different fields of policy and action to which they pertain and 
as different as the respective orientation of the authors, be their intent critical, 
affirmative, or strictly technocratic.
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